The paper examines the behaviour of "evolutionary" models with epsilon-noise like those which have been used recently to discuss the evolution of social conventions. The paper is built around two main observations: that the "long run stochastic stability" of a convention is related to the speed...

This paper considers the repeated prisoner's dilemma in a large-population random-matching setting where players are unable to recognize their opponents. Despite the informational restrictions, cooperation is still a sequential equilibrium supported by 'contagious' punishments. The equilibrium...

We consider an infinitely repeated Bertrand game, in which prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed, i.i.d. cost shock in each period. We focus on symmetric perfect public equilibria, wherein any "punishments" are borne equally by all firms. We identify a tradeoff...

We consider an infinitely repeated Bertrand game, in which prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed, i.i.d. cost shock in each period. We focus on symmetric perfect public equilibria, wherein any "punishments" are borne equally by all firms. We identify a tradeoff...