We analyse preferences over finite decision problems in order to model decision-makers with "changing tastes". we provide conditions on these preferences that identify the Strotz model of consistent planning. building on an example given by <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="R8">Peleg and Yaari (1973)</xref>, we show that for problems with...

We consider a market in which an expert must exert costly but unobservable effort to identify the service that meets the consumer's need. In our model, experts offer competing contracts and the consumer may gather multiple opinions. We explore the incentives that a competitive sampling of prices...

We construct an infinite horizon model of harmful addiction. Consumption is" compulsive "if it differs from what the individual would have chosen had commitment been available. A good is" addictive "if its consumption leads to more compulsive consumption of the same good. We analyse the welfare...

We analyse preferences over finite decision problems in order to model decision-makers with "changing tastes". We provide conditions on these preferences that identify the Strotz model of consistent planning. Building on an example given by Peleg and Yaari (1973), we show that for problems with...

We analyse political contests (campaigns) between two parties with opposing interests. Parties provide costly information to voters who choose a policy. The information flow is continuous and stops when both parties quit. Parties' actions are strategic substitutes: increasing one party's cost...

We construct an infinite horizon model of harmful addiction. Consumption is compulsive if it differs from what the individual would have chosen had commitment been available. A good is addictive if its consumption leads to more compulsive consumption of the same good. We analyse the welfare...

We consider a market in which an expert must exert costly but unobservable effort to identify the service that meets the consumer's need. In our model, experts offer competing contracts and the consumer may gather multiple opinions. We explore the incentives that a competitive sampling of prices...

This paper studies reputation effects in games with a single long-run player whose choice of stage-game strategy is imperfectly observed by his opponents. The authors obtain lower and upper bounds on the long-run player's payoff in any Nash equilibrium of the game. If the long-run player's...