We study contractual arrangements that support an efficient use of time in a knowledge-intensive economy in which agents endogenously specialize in either production or consulting. The resulting market for advice is plagued by informational problems, since both the difficulty of the questions...

This paper studies moral hazard in teams using a model where efforts are promoted via the combination of profit shares and relational contracts. The focus is on how these two forms of incentives interact. According to the degree of effort observability and the importance of future interaction,...

This paper studies moral hazard in teams using a model where efforts are promoted via the combination of profit shares and relational contracts. The focus is on how these two forms of incentives interact. According to the degree of effort observability and the importance of future interaction,...

A monetary union is modelled as a technology that makes a surprise policy deviation impossible and requires voluntarily participating countries to follow the same monetary policy. Within a fully dynamic context, we show that such an arrangement may dominate a regime with independent national...

A monetary union is modelled as a technology that makes a "surprise" policy deviation impossible and requires voluntarily participating countries to follow the same monetary policy. Within a fully dynamic context, we show that such an arrangement may dominate a regime with independent national...