The authors study a general implementation problem for exchange economies with a continuum of players and private information, and test the robustness of the results for sequences of approximating finite economies. Assuming that the designer knows the distribution of the characteristics in the...

This paper uses a simple multitask career concern model in order to analyze the incentives of government agency officials. Incentives are impaired by the agency pursuing multiple missions. A lack of focus is even more problematic in the case of fuzzy missions, that is when outsiders are...

Many incentives in organizations arise not through explicit formal incentive contracts but rather implicitly through career concerns. This paper models career concerns through agents trying to manipulate the market assessment of their future productivity. The information flow from current...

This paper analyzes contracts as means of strategic commitment against outside parties. It considers the ex ample of an incumbent firm that enters a contractual relationship wit h its workers in order to deter entry. The parties cannot precommit n ot to renegotiate the contract once entry has...

This analysis uncovers and compares two competing effects of growth on unemployment. The first is a capitalization effect, whereby an increase in growth raises the capitalized returns from creating jobs and consequently reduces the equilibrium rate of unemployment. The second is a creative...