We study strategic information transmission in an organization consisting of an infinite sequence of individual decision-makers. Each decision-maker chooses an action and receives an informative but imperfect signal of the once-and-for-all realization of an unobserved state. The state affects...

Preemption games are widely used to model economic problems such as patent races. We introduce private information into these games and allow for this information to stochastically change over time. This reflects, e.g. how R&D competitors improve their innovations over time and keep these...

We develop a dynamic repeated election model in which citizen candidates are distinguished by both their ideology and valence. Voters observe an incumbent's valence and policy choices but only know the challenger's party. Our model provides a rich set of novel results. In contrast to existing...

We develop a model of endogenous productivity change to examine the impact of the investment in knowledge on the productivity of firms. Our dynamic investment model extends the tradition of the knowledge capital model of <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B30">Griliches (1979)</xref> that has remained a cornerstone of the productivity...