Customer relationship management and marketing analytics have become critical for nonlife insurers operating in highly competitive markets. As it is easier to develop an existing customer than to acquire a new one, cross-selling and retention are key activities. In this research, we focus on...

We study the optimal insurance design problem. This is a risk sharing problem between an insured and an insurer. The main novelty in this paper is that we study this optimization problem under a risk-adjusted premium calculation principle for the insurance cover. This risk-adjusted premium...

In the classical expected utility framework, a problem of optimal insurance design with a premium constraint is equivalent to a problem of optimal insurance design with a minimum expected retention constraint. When the insurer has ambiguous beliefs represented by a non-additive probability...

In this paper we analyze insurance demand when the utility function depends both upon final wealth and the level of losses or gains relative to a reference point. Besides some comparative statics results, we discuss the links with first-order risk aversion, with the Omega measure, and with a...

Audit mechanisms frequently take place in the context of repeated relationships between auditor and auditee. This paper focuses attention on the insurance fraud problem in a setting where insurers repeatedly verify claims satisfied by service providers (e.g., affiliated car repairers or members...

The use of personalization mechanisms should allow the insurance distributor to reduce exploration costs and adjust the offered insurance product to the needs, features, and situation of each individual client. This study seeks to examine how liability should be allocated when the process of the...

The purpose of this paper is an analysis of the presence of self-selection mechanisms on the market that could bring the market closer to the separating equilibrium state, in line with the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium model and its subsequent modifications. An example is the Polish market of...

This article studies insurance demand in a two-period framework in which an individual faces risks in both current and future periods. Models for insurance with and without the presence of endogenous saving are both discussed. In contrast to what most literature suggests, when decisions on...

This paper studies the problem of optimal reinsurance contract design. We let the insurer use dual utility, and the premium is an extended Wang's premiumprinciple. The novel contribution is that we allow for heterogeneity in the beliefs regarding the underlying probability distribution. We...

The value of information regarding risk class for a monopoly insurer and its customers is examined in both symmetric and asymmetric information environments. A monopolist always prefers contracting with uninformed customers as this maximizes the rent extracted under symmetric information while...