We develop an economic model of greenwash, in which a firm strategically discloses environmental information and a non-governmental organization (NGO) may audit and penalize the firm for failing to fully disclose its environmental impacts. We identify conditions under which NGO punishment of...

We model competing ecolabels sponsored by an industry trade association and an environmental group. For either sponsor in autarky, multi-tier labels are more attractive when there are many producers with high cost of quality, and the cost gap between low-cost and high-cost firms is large. When...

Businesses and green activists seek to influence public attention to the social impacts of a sector — they play salience games. An activist allocates funds between campaigning against a polluting industry and other environmental projects. When public attention is scarce, a greater campaign...

Corporate greenwash has accelerated in recent years, bringing in its wake growing skepticism about corporate green claims. Although a theory of the drivers and deterrents of greenwash has begun to emerge, it is static in nature and does not incorporate the full range of ways in which firms can...

A large literature in strategy and management has focused on why firms self-regulate and "signal green." We show this decision becomes more complex when regulators have enforcement discretion, and both firms and regulators act strategically. We model the managerial decision whether to signal the...