This paper studies the relation between firm value and a firm's growth options. We find strong empirical evidence that (average) Tobin's Q increases with firm-level volatility. However, the significance mainly comes from R&D firms, which have more growth options than non-R&D firms. By...

This paper studies a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model involving climate change. Our model allows for damages on economic growth resulting from global warming. In the calibration, we capture effects from climate change and feedback effects on the temperature dynamics. We solve for the...

This paper studies the relation between firm value and a firm's growth options. We find strong empirical evidence that (average) Tobin's Q increases with firm-level volatility. The significance mainly comes from R&D firms, which have more growth options than non-R&D firms. By decomposing...

This paper studies a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model involving climate change. Our frame- work allows for feedback effects on the temperature dynamics. We are able to match estimates of future temperature distributions provided in the fifth assessment report of the IPCC (2014). We...

We develop a simple theoretical model to motivate testable hypotheses about how peer-to-peer (P2P) platforms compete with banks for loans. The model predicts that (i) P2P lending grows when some banks are faced with exogenously higher regulatory costs; (ii) P2P loans are riskier than bank loans;...

We empirically examine the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) used by the US gov- ernment to bail out distressed banks with equity infusions during the Great Recession. We find strong evidence that a feature of the CPP – the government’s ability to ap- point independent directors on the board of...

We derive three testable predictions from a bank-P2P lender model of competition: (a) P2P lending grows when some banks are faced with exogenously higher regulatory costs; (b) P2P loans are riskier than bank loans; and (c) the risk-adjusted interest rates on P2P loans are lower than those on...

We empirically examine the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) used by the US government to bail out distressed banks with equity infusions during the Great Recession. We find strong evidence that a feature of the CPP - the government's ability to appoint independent directors on the board of an...

We derive three testable predictions from a bank-P2P lender model of competition: (i) P2P lending grows when some banks are faced with exogenously higher regulatory costs, (ii) P2P loans are riskier than bank loans; and (iii) the risk-adjusted interest rates on P2P-loans are lower than those on...

We derive three testable predictions from a bank-P2P lender model of competition: (a) P2P lending grows when some banks are faced with exogenously higher regulatory costs, (b) P2P loans are riskier than bank loans; and (c) the risk-adjusted interest rates on P2P loans are lower than those on...