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We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333804
contest. In both cases, when decisions to share information are made independently, sharing information is strictly dominated …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334110
We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium … the distribution costs are drawn from and on the exact specification of the contest success function. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334145
We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our … experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is … independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011637947
This paper considers evolutionarily stable decisions about whether to initiate violent conflict rather than accepting a … of peaceful resource allocations that are rejected in favor of violent conflict, compared to the Nash equilibrium …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333783
We study endogenous group formation in tournaments employing experimental three-player contests. We find that players in endogenously formed alliances cope better with the moral hazard problem in groups than players who are forced into an alliance. Also, players who are committed to expending...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333950
conflict and more intense fighting. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334047
contests. Players may win a prize for winning each component contest, as well as a prize for winning the overall race. Each … component contest is an all-pay auction with complete information. We characterize the unique equilibrium analytically and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334077
This paper considers incentives for information acquisition ahead of conflicts. First, we characterize the (unique) equilibrium of the all-pay auction between two players with one-sided asymmetric information where one player has private information about his valuation. Then, we use ou rresults...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334005
which the player expending the greater resources wins. In equilibrium, contest effort concentrates on at most two adjacent … by which the allocation of prizes are governed by possibly repeated conflict. Our results contribute to an explanation … why. Compared to a single stage conflict, such structures can reduce the overall resources that are dissipated among the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333854