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In this note we study a very simple trial & error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity by one unit as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that despite the absence of...
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The endowment effect describes the fact that people demand much more to give up an object than they are willing to spend to acquire it. The existence of this effect has been documented in numerous experiments. We attempt to explain this effect by showing that evolution favors individuals whose...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010983499
In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus....
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010983508
In this paper, we experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). In their duopoly game, firms can choose their quantities in one of two periods before the market clears. If a firm commits to a quantity in period 1 it does not know whether the...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010983637
We report on an experiment designed to compare Stackelberg and Cournot duopoly markets with quantity competition. For each market we implement both a random matching and fixed-pairs version. Stackelberg markets yield, regardless of the matching scheme, higher outputs than Cournot markets. Under...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010983695
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Weekly repo auctions are the European Central Bank's most important policy instrument. Provided that banks bid seriously, these auctions should reveal useful information about banks' liquidity needs and the stance of monetary policy. However 1 as we show in this paper, the applied auction rules...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010983605