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Mohlin, Erik - 2010

results are extended to a model of learning, in which type k plays a k times iterated best response the average of past play …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281423

Patience and ultimatum in bargaining

Segendorff, Björn - 2002

This study investigates in a two-stage two-player model how the decision to make an ultimatum and how much to demand depends on the impatience of the agents and the pie uncertainty. First, players simultaneously decide on their ultimatums. If the ultimatum(s) are compatible then the player(s)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281330

Patience and Ultimatum in Bargaining

Segendorff, Björn - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649308

Delegation of Bargaining and Power

Segendorff, Björn - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 1998

Two principals simultaneously appoint one agent each and decide how much power to give to their agents. The agents' task is to bargain over the provision of a public good. Power here means the right to decide the own side's provision if negotiations break down. In equilibrium the principals...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005771176

Delegation as at threat in bargaining

Segendorff, Björn - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 1996

in a bargaining game over the provision of a public good, two principals appoint one agent each to carry out the bargaining. Each agent has preferences over the outcome. Two institutional set-ups are studied, each with a different level of authority given to the agents. By authority is here...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005190840

Stochastic better-supply dynamics in games

Josephson, Jens - 2000

In Young (1993, 1998) agents are recurrently matched to play a finite game and almost always play a myopic best reply to a frequency distribution based on a sample from the recent history of play. He proves that in a generic class of finite n-player games, as the mutation rate tends to zero,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281156

Efficiency, communication and honesty

Demichelis, Stefano; Weibull, Jörgen W. - 2006

We here develop a model of pre-play communication that generalizes the cheap-talk approach by allowing players to have a lexicographic preference, second to the payoffs in the underlying game, for honesty. We formalize this by way of an honesty (or truth) correspondence between actions and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281162

Clever agents in adaptive learning

Matros, Alexander - 2000

in general finite two-player games. We show that Young's [9] prediction is robust: adaptive learning with clever agents …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281177

Evolutionary dynamics do not lead to correlated equilibria

Viossat, Yannick - 2006

In (Viossat, 2006, The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria, forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior), it was shown that the replicator dynamics may eliminate all pure strategies used in correlated equilibrium, so that only strategies that do not take part in any...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281341

A numerical analysis of the evolutionary stability of learning rules

Josephson, Jens - 2001

In this paper I define an evolutionary stability criterion for learning rules. Using Monte Carlo simulations, I then … apply this criterion to a class of learning rules that can be represented by Camerer and Ho's (1999) model of learning. This … class contains perturbed versions of reinforcement and belief learning as special cases. A large population of individuals …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281359