Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 112
Cover Image
When Does Communication Improve Coordination?
Ellingsen, Tore; Östling, Robert - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2007
×2 games. One-way communication weakly increases coordination on Nash equilibrium outcomes, although average payoffs sometimes … of symmetric 2×2 games, we find that communication facilitates coordination in common interest games with positive … spillovers and strategic complementarities, but there are also games in which any type of communication hampers coordination. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005771174
Cover Image
Contracts and promises: An approach to pre-play agreements
Miettinen, Topi - 2008
In line with the widely applied principle of just deserts, we assume that the severity of the penalty on a contract offender increases in the harm on the other. When this principle holds, the influence of the efficiency of the agreement on the incentives to abide by it crucially depends on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281267
Cover Image
Contracts and Promises - An Approach to Pre-play Agreements
Miettinen, Topi - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2008
In line with the widely applied principle of just deserts, we assume that the severity of the penalty on a contract offender increases in the harm on the other. When this principle holds, the influence of the efficiency of the agreement on the incentives to abide by it crucially depends on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005190823
Cover Image
Epistemic robustness of sets closed under rational behavior
Asheim, Geir; Voorneveld, Mark; Weibull, Jörgen W. - 2009
This paper provides two conditions of epistemic robustness, robustness to alternative best replies and robustness to non-best replies, and uses them to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281186
Cover Image
Learning to be prepared
Kets, Willemien; Voorneveld, Mark - 2005
Behavioral economics provides several motivations for the common observation that agents appear somewhat unwilling to deviate from recent choices: salience, inertia, the formation of habits, the use of rules of thumb, or the locking in on certain modes of behavior due to learning by doing. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281202
Cover Image
Preparation and toolkit learning
Voorneveld, Mark - 2002
A product set of pure strategies is a prep set (prep is short for preparation) if it contains at least one best reply to any consistent belief that a player may have about the strategic behavior of his opponents. Minimal prep sets are shown to exists in a class of strategic games satisfying...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281296
Cover Image
Evolution of theories of mind
Mohlin, Erik - 2010
This paper studies the evolution of peoples' models of how other people think - their theories of mind. First, this is formalized within the level-k model, which postulates a hierarchy of types, such that type k plays a k times iterated best response to the uniform distribution. It is found...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281423
Cover Image
Learning to be prepared
Kets, Willemien; Voorneveld, Mark - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2005
Behavioral economics provides several motivations for the common observation that agents appear somewhat unwilling to deviate from recent choices: salience, inertia, the formation of habits, the use of rules of thumb, or the locking in on certain modes of behavior due to learning by doing. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423867
Cover Image
Epistemic robustness of sets closed under rational behavior
Asheim, Geir; Voorneveld, Mark; Weibull, Jörgen W. - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2009
This paper provides two conditions of epistemic robustness, robustness to alternative best replies and robustness to non-best replies, and uses them to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649229
Cover Image
Preparation and toolkit learning
Voorneveld, Mark - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2002
A product set of pure strategies is a prep set ("prep" is short for "preparation") if it contains at least one best reply to any consistent belief that a player may have about the strategic behavior of his opponents. Minimal prep sets are shown to exists in a class of strategic games satisfying...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005207193