Showing 1 - 10 of 106
This study investigates in a two-stage two-player model how the decision to make an ultimatum and how much to demand depends on the impatience of the agents and the pie uncertainty. First, players simultaneously decide on their ultimatums. If the ultimatum(s) are compatible then the player(s)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281330
This study investigates in a two-stage two-player model how the decision to make an ultimatum and how much to demand depends on the impatience of the agents and the pie uncertainty. First, players simultaneously decide on their ultimatums. If the ultimatum(s) are compatible then the player(s)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649308
Two principals simultaneously appoint one agent each and decide how much power to give to their agents. The agents' task is to bargain over the provision of a public good. Power here means the right to decide the own side's provision if negotiations break down. In equilibrium the principals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005771176
in a bargaining game over the provision of a public good, two principals appoint one agent each to carry out the bargaining. Each agent has preferences over the outcome. Two institutional set-ups are studied, each with a different level of authority given to the agents. By authority is here...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005190840
The Kyle (1985) model is extended to take into account market maker competition and the spread. It is shown that with a spread the Kyle model has a Nash equilibrium also with two market makers, not only with three or more, as shown in earlier research. The spread is endogenized, and two testable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281344
The Kyle (1985) model is extended to take into account market maker competition and the spread. It is shown that with a spread the Kyle model has a Nash equilibrium also with two market makers, not only with three or more, as shown in earlier research. The spread is endogenized, and two testable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649280
First established during the 1830's, the Enskilda banks were characterized by unlimited owner liability and the right to issue bank notes. Consequently, in Swedish banking history, these banks have been considered to be primitive relics. This paper utilizes new data to revise this picture of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281241
First established during the 1830's, the Enskilda banks were characterized by unlimited owner liability and the right to issue bank notes. Consequently, in Swedish banking history, these banks have been considered to be primitive relics. This paper utilizes new data to revise this picture of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005207180
The Shapley-Ichiishi result states that a game is convex if and only if the convex hull of marginal vectors equals the core. In this paper we generalize this result by distinguishing equivalence classes of balanced games that share the same core structure. We then associate a system of linear...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281187
The Shapley-Ichiishi result states that a game is convex if and only if the convex hull of marginal vectors equals the core. In this paper we generalize this result by distinguishing equivalence classes of balanced games that share the same core structure. We then associate a system of linear...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423841