We consider non-cooperative environments in which two players have the power to commit but cannot sign binding agreements. We show that by committing to a set of actions rather than to a single action, players can implement a wide range of action profiles. We give a complete characterization of...

In this study we investigate the impact of competition on markets for non-durable goods where intertemporal price discrimination is possible. We develop a simple model of different potential scenarios for intertemporal price discrimination and implement it in a laboratory experiment. We compare...

Wage posting models of job search typically assume that firms can commit to paying workers the posted wage. This paper investigates the consequences of relaxing this assumption. Under ``downward'' commitment, firms can commit only to paying at least their advertised wage. We show that wage...

We develop a model of favor exchange in a network setting where the cost of performing favors is stochastic. For any given favor exchange norm, we allow for the endogenous determination of the network structure via a link deletion game. We characterize the set of stable as well as equilibrium...

The Zollverein, a customs union, of 1834 was the outcome of sequential accession negotiations between Prussia and other German states. This paper applies a bargaining model to analyse the choices of negotiation structure and institutional form of a customs union. The existence of negative...

If either property rights or institutions are weak, agents who create wealth by cooperating will later have an incentive to fight over the distribution of it. In this paper we investigate theoretically and experimentally the circumstances under which welfare losses from investment in...