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When the number of players is small in a weighted majority voting game, it can occur that one of the players has no influence on the result of the vote, in spite of a strictly positive weight. Such a player is called a “dummy” player in game theory. The purpose of this paper is to...
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Peleg (1978) presents a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core, by considering quota games. The purpose of this paper is to present a similar result for the non-emptiness of another solution concept introduced by Rubinstein (1980) and called the stability set. <!--ID="" Acknowledgments. I am grateful to Maurice Salles, Vincent Merlin and Ashley Piggins for many helpful comments. I have a particular debt to Michel Le Breton for suggesting improvements in the proof of theorem 2. Of course, all errors remain the author's responsibility.-->
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Consider a group of individuals who have to collectively choose an outcome from a finite set of feasible alternatives. A scoring or positional rule is an aggregation procedure where each voter awards a given number of points, wj, to the alternative she ranks in jth position in her preference...
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The semivalues (as well as the least square values) propose different linear solutions for cooperative games with transferable utility. As a byproduct, they also induce a ranking of the players. So far, no systematic analysis has studied to which extent these rankings could vary for different...
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