The number of Arrovian constitutions, when N agents are to rank n alternatives, is p(n)p(n)N, where p(n) is the number of weak orderings of n alternatives. For n\leq15, p(n) is the nearest integer to n!/2(log2)n+1, the dominant term of a series derived by contour integration of the generating...

This paper considers the distribution of coalitional influence under probabilistic social choice functions which are randomized social choice rules that allow social indifference by mapping each combination of a preference profile and a feasible set to a social choice lottery over all possible...

By using a line of reasoning similar to the one used by Gibbard (Gibbard A (1973) Econometrica 41: 587-601) in the deterministic framework, we provide a more transparent and intuitive proof of the following random dictatorship result in the probabilistic framework, which is a corollary credited...

We consider probabilistic voting procedures which map each feasible set of alternatives and each utility profile to a social choice lottery over the feasible set. It is shown that if we impose: (i) a probabilistic collective rationality condition known as regularity; (ii) probabilistic...