One of the main issues in economic allocation problems is the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism. In the context of cooperative games this trade-off can be framed as one of choosing to allocate according to the Shapley value or the equal division solution. In this paper we provide...

We provide alternative axiomatic characterizations of the extended egalitarian rules (Moreno-Ternero and Roemer, Econometrica 74:1419–1427, <CitationRef CitationID="CR9">2006</CitationRef>) in a fixed-population setting of the canonical resource allocation model based on individual capabilities (output functions). Our main axioms are...</citationref>

A quasi-linear social choice problem is concerned with choosing one among a finite set of public projects and determining side payments among agents to cover the cost of the project, assuming each agent has quasi-linear preferences. We first investigate the logical relations between various...

We consider plurality voting games being simple games in partition function form such that in every partition there is at least one winning coalition. Such a game is said to be weighted if it is possible to assign weights to the players in such a way that a winning coalition in a partition is...

In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value restricted to the class of apex games using an equal loss property which states that the payoff of an apex player and a non-apex player decrease by the same amount if we make this particular non-apex player a null player. We also...