Consider the following problem: a set of candidates {x, y, z} has to be ranked from best to worse by a committee. Each member of the committee provides his own ranking of the three candidates and you decide to use the Borda method to aggregate the rankings. The resulting scores are as follows:...

The main flaw of the Condorcet method is that a Condorcet winner does not always exist (when there is a top cycle). Moreover, in some cases, all candidates are contained in one cycle and, therefore, a society or committee using the Condorcet method risks to face a severe indeterminacy. An...

<Para ID="Par1">We study mechanism design in quasi-linear private values environments when there are two alternatives. We show that under a mild range condition, every implementable allocation rule is a generalized utility function maximizer. In unbounded domains, if we replace our range condition by an...</para>

Procedures designed to select alternatives on the basis of the results of pairwise contests between them have received much attention in literature. The particular case of tournaments has been studied in depth. More recently weak tournaments and valued generalizations thereof have been...