In this note we study the robustness of optimal organizational architectures, focusing on hierarchies and polyarchies. These two specific architectures are often applied in economic systems and have received considerable attention in the literature. It turns out that the application of these...

This paper provides first the condition under which the majority of an odd number of jurists is more likely to choose the better of two alternatives than a single jurist selected at random from the jurists, given that each jurist has a probability larger than one half of choosing correctly, and...

This paper derives a simple characterization of how to optimally divide an organization’s experts into different decision-making committees. The focus is on many three-member committees that make decisions by a simple majority rule. We find that the allocation of experts to committees is...

This paper derives optimal decision rules for fixed-size committees in polychotomous choice situations. Earlier studies focus on the dichotomous choice model and thus the present extension broadens the scope of applications of the theory of collective decision making.

Recently, Karotkin (1993) has shown that in the symmetric uncertain dichotomous choice model the set of restricted majority rules (RMRs) is special in the sense that a member of this family of rules is always the worst rule among the potentially optimal weighted majority rules (WMRs). In the...

The common choice theory in economics is based on the assumption that an individual is defined in terms of a binary preference relation. This preference relation is defined over alternatives without taking into account menu dependence and, in particular, freedom of choice or, more generally, the...

The means of contest design may include differential taxation of the prize. This paper considers all-pay auctions under complete information and establishes that, given a revenue-maximizing contest designer who faces a balanced-budget constraint, the optimal taxation scheme corresponding to an...

Collective contests are examined permitting heterogeneity of stakes within every competing group. Our first concern is whether unequal distribution of stakes in a group can enhance its win probability. Our second concern is whether a large stake in a group can be individually disadvantageous. We...