In the discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation (Bahel and Trudeau in Int J Game Theory 42:439–460, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">2013a</CitationRef>), we study the implications of a number of properties that strengthen the well-known dummy axiom. Our main axiom, which requires that costless units of demands do not...</citationref>

We reconsider the problem of aggregating individual preference orderings into a single social ordering when alternatives are lotteries and individual preferences are of the von Neumann–Morgenstern type. Relative egalitarianism ranks alternatives by applying the leximin ordering to the...

We reconsider the problem of provision and cost-sharing of multiple public goods. The efficient equal factor equivalent allocation rule makes every agent indifferent between what he receives and the opportunity of choosing the bundle of public goods subject to the constraint of paying r times...