We study a sequential Tullock contest with two stages and two identical prizes. The players compete for one prize in each stage and each player may win either one or two prizes. The players have either decreasing or increasing marginal values for the prizes, which are commonly known, and there...

We study a dynamic contest between two players who compete against each other in <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$n$$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> different stages. The players have winning values for each stage of the contest that may vary across the stages as well as heterogeneous resource budgets that decrease from a given stage to the next...</equationsource></inlineequation>

We study a sequential all-pay auction with two contestants who are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. We characterize the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this sequential all-pay auction and analyze if giving a head start, i.e., an exogenously...