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Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives
Mihara, H. Reiju - In: Social choice and welfare 17 (2000) 3, pp. 393-402
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001498054
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Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with restricted coalition algebras
Mihara, H. Reiju - In: Social choice and welfare 14 (1997) 4, pp. 503-512
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001228786
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Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function : a constructive proof
Mihara, H. Reiju - In: Social choice and welfare 18 (2001) 3, pp. 543-553
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001603716
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The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games
Kumabe, Masahiro; Mihara, H. Reiju - In: Social choice and welfare 31 (2008) 4, pp. 621-640
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003772042
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Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof
Reiju Mihara, H. - In: Social choice and welfare 18 (2001) 3, pp. 543-554
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006901200
Cover Image
Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives
Reiju Mihara, H. - In: Social choice and welfare 17 (2000) 3, pp. 393-402
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006908563