We study the possibility of efficient trade with informationally interdependent valuations. In a model based on the bilateral trade situation studied in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) efficient trade is only possible in trivial cases where the seller's valuation always exceeds the buyer's...

In a symmetric independent private values setting a sealed-bid double auction dissolves a partnership efficiently. This well known result remains valid in a model with interdependent valuations. However, if common values components are large agents might prefer not to participate in a double...

We analyze the possibility of efficient trade with informationally interdependent valuations and with a dispersed ownership. A crucial role is played by the sign of the derivatives that measure how valuation functions depend on others’ signals. If valuations are increasing functions of other...

We analyze an independent private values model where a number of objects are sold in sequential first- and second-price auctions. Bidders have unit demand and their valuation for an object is decreasing in the rank number of the auction to which it is sold. Whether prices are announced after...