This paper analyses the auction designs chosen for awarding 3G licenses in the UK and in Germany and compares them with respect to revenues and bidders� surplus using a laboratory experiment. In our study with a given number of bidders, the German design leads to higher revenues. However,...

An analysis of the available National Allocation Plans for the first period (2005�2007) of the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) implies (i) that the total allocation to installations covered under the EU ETS is fairly generous and (ii) that most, if not all EU Member States ban the...

Admitting banking in emissions trading systems reduces overall compliance costs by allowing for inter-temporal flexibility: cost savings can be traded over time. However, unless individual EU Member States (MS) decide differently, the transfer of unused allowances from the period of 2005-2007...

We investigate the problem of optimally timing production schedules in an emissions trading regime that does not allow the transfer of unused allowances into future periods. We show that companies that produce storable goods partially shift the production to prior periods and imitate - by...

In an experimental study the auction procedure of the fixed rate tender is investigated with which the main refinancing operation of the Eurosystem was carried out in the past. In June 2000 the fixed rate tender was replaced by the 'American' variable rate tender. This change was occasioned by...

In game-theoretical models with local interaction it is usually assumed that fixed local interaction structures are imposed exogenously and do not evolve during the course of the game. However, this assumption does not make much sense in economics. We model the evolution of interaction...

We present a series of experimental coordination games with a payoff-dominant and a risk-dominant Nash equilibrium. We examine in how far local interaction structures have effects on players' strategy choices. Our three major observations are the following: First, local interaction with open...

In public goods experiments where subjects may change groups, we observe a continual flight of the more cooperative subjects from the less cooperative ones. The less cooperative subjects attempt to enter cooperative groups in order to free-ride on their contributions.

Monopolies are frequently characterized by the following allocation rule: if the total demand is not greater than the supply, each buyer receives her desired amount in full; and if the total demand exceeds the supply, the supply is distributed proportionally according to the individual desired...

A population of players is considered in which each agent can select her neighbors in order to play a 2x2 Hawk-Dove game with each of them. We design our experiment in continuous time where participants may change their Hawk-Dove action and/or their neighborhood at any point in time. We are...