We show how the interbank payment system can become illiquid following wide-scale disruptions. Two forces are at play in such disruptions—operational problems and changes in participants’ behavior. We model the interbank payment system as an n-player game and utilize the concept of a...

This paper describes a proposal for operating a centralized netting queue for non-urgent interbank payments that involves take-it-or-leave-it offers and allocates liquidity costs using the Shapely value. This method achieves fairness and ensures welfare maximizing netting proposals are agreeable...

This paper uses reinforcement learning (RL) to approximate the policy rules of banks participating in a high-value payments system. The objective of the agents is to learn a policy function for the choice of amount of liquidity provided to the system at the beginning of the day. Individual...

Using detailed data from Canada's new high-value payment system (HVPS), we show how participants of the system save liquidity by exploiting the new gridlock resolution arrangement. These observed behaviors are consistent with the equilibrium of a "gridlock game" that captures the key incentives...

This paper explains the nature of interest rates in the U.S. federal funds market after the 2007-09 financial crisis. We build a model of the over-the-counter lending market that incorporates new aspects of the financial system: abundance of liquidity, different regulatory standards for banks,...