This paper provides a model of systemic panic among financial institutions with heterogeneous fragilities. Concerns about potential spillovers from each other generate strategic interaction among institutions, triggering a preemption game in which one tries to exit the market before the others...

We build a general equilibrium model with financial frictions that impede the effectiveness of monetary policy in stimulating output. Agents with heterogeneous productivity can increase investment by levering up, but this increases interim liquidity risk. In equilibrium, the more productive...

Better customer service provisions by banks - such as more branches and ATMs, longer business hours, and more personalized services - help attract more core deposits and increase funding stickiness by raising depositors' switching costs and enhancing their loyalty. Funding stickiness from...

We study how monetary policy affects the funding composition of the banking sector. When monetary tightening reduces the retail deposit supply owing to, for example, a decrease in bank reserves or in money demand, banks try to substitute the deposit outflows with more wholesale funding in order...

The supplementary leverage ratio (SLR) rule recently imposed on the very largest U.S. banks has revived the question of whether banks sidestep such rules by shifting toward riskier, higher-yielding assets. Using difference-in-difference analysis, we find that, after the SLR was finalized in...

Prior to the Great Depression, regulators imposed double liability on bank shareholders to ensure financial stability and protect depositors. Under double liability, shareholders of failing banks lost their initial investment and had to pay up to the par value of the stock in order to compensate...