We show that every (random) assignment/allocation without transfers can be considered as a market outcome with personalized prices and an equal income. One can thus evaluate an assignment by investigating the prices and the induced opportunity sets. When prices are proportional across agents,...

Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes for Two-Sided Matching Using the assignment of students to schools as our leading example, we study many-to-one two-sided matching markets without transfers. Students are endowed with cardinal preferences and schools with ordinal ones, while preferences...

The paper empirically explores how more trade transparency affects market liquidity. The analysis takes advantage of a unique setting in which the Shanghai Stock Exchange offered more trade transparency to market participants subscribing to a new software package. First, the results show that...

The Boston mechanism is criticized for its poor incentive and welfare performance compared with the Gale-Shapley deferred-acceptance mechanism (DA). Using school choice data from Beijing, I investigate parents' behavior under the Boston mechanism, taking into account parents' possible mistakes...

Political conflicts causing diplomatic tension and political unrest rarely escalate into direct violence or war. This paper identifies the financial effects of such non-violent political tension by examining Taiwan’s sovereignty debate. Non-violent events harming the relationship with mainland...

The Boston mechanism is criticized for its poor incentive and welfare performance compared to the Gale-Shapley deferred-acceptance mechanism (DA). Using school choice data from Beijing, I investigate parents’ behavior under the Boston mechanism, taking into account parents’ possible mistakes...