In this paper, we clarify the relationship between influence/power measurement and utility measurement, the most popular two social objective criteria used when evaluating voting mechanisms. For one particular probabilistic model describing the preferences of the electorate, the so-called...

L’objet de cet article est d’examiner, à la lumière de deux solutions majeures de la théorie des jeux coopératifs, les coalitions/négociations électorales qui ont lieu dans le cas où le mode de scrutin est un scrutin proportionnel avec listes bloquées, prime au gagnant et comportant...

The paper proposes a way to measure mechanical and psychological effects of majority runoff versus plurality electoral systems in candidate elections. Building on a series of laboratory experiments, we evaluate these effects with respect to the probability of electing a Condorcet winner...

We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked preferences we find that the rational choice theory provides very good predictions of actual individual behavior in one-round and approval voting elections, but fares poorly in explaining vote choice...

This paper proposes a game to study strategic communication on platforms by parties. Parties’ platforms have been chosen in a multidimensional policy space, but are imperfectly known by voters. Parties strategically decide the emphasis they put on the various issues, and thus the precision of...

In this paper, we introduce a game-theoretical non-cooperative model of bargaining to analyse project funding in the French river basin com- mittees. After sorting out some of the main theoretical predictions, we proceed with an empirical application to the subsidy policy of French Wa- ter...

The main purpose of this short paper is to examine how traditional Downsian dynamics (convergence of the parties to the median of the distribution) are altered by the introduction of centrifugal incentives arising from the fact that any motion towards the center induces a lost of votes at the...

The main purpose of this paper is to estimate the probability of casting a decisive vote for a class or random electorate models encompassing the celebrated IC and IAC models. The emphasis is on the impact of correlation across votes on the order of magnitude of this event. Our proof techniques...

Nous exploitons dans cet article la théeorie des indices de pouvoir pour éevaluer les infuences respectives des deux classes d’électeurs dans le mode de scrutin instauré par la loi électorale du 29 juin 1820, dite loi du \double vote". Nous montrons, à l’aide d’un modèle simplifié,...

This article studies a model of coalition formation for the joint production (and finance) of public projects, in which agents may belong to multiple coalitions. We show that, if projects are divisible, there always exists a stable (secession-proof) structure, i.e., a structure in which no...