n this paper we investigate the implementation problem arising when some of the players are ``faulty" in the sense that they fail to act optimally. The exact number and identity of the faulty players is unknown to the planner and to the nonfaulty players, but it is common knowledge that there...

This paper argues that when organizations are imperfect in the sense that members may make mistakes and messages may be distorted, then the inner structure of the organization should be explicitly modeled. This paper proposes a framework for studying games between imperfect organizations.

Nash equilibrium is often interpreted as a steady state in which each player holds the correct expectations about the other players` behavior and acts rationally. This paper investigates the robustness of this interpretation when players` preferences are affected by their forecasts about the...

This paper shows that both Arrow`s Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem follow from a single impossibility theorem. This theorem states that two properties - Pareto efficiency and a condition called Preference Reversal - lead to the dictatorship result.

This paper is the Schwartz Memorial Lecture, delivered at Kellogg, Northwestern University in May 1998. The lecture introduces some ideas about the possible use of tools taken from the economics literature to explain language phenomena. Two specific issues are discussed: From the domain of...

We asked subjects to self-select into one of two constests, "coin" or "die." The winner in each of the contest is the person with most correct guesses of 20 coin flips or 20 rolls of a die, respectively. Most subjects reported that they belived that most people would go to the "coin" group. They...

The paper questions the methodology of "economics and psychology". It focuses on the case of hyperbolic discounting. Using some experimental results, I argue that the same sort of evidence which rejects the standard constant discount utility functions can just as easily reject hyperbolic...

The paper argues for the formal investigation of conditions under which that preference reltions are definable in various simple languages. An example of such an investigation is given.

In many decision scenarios, one has to choose an element from a set S given some reference point e. For the case where S is a subset of the Euclidean space , we axiomatize the choice method that selects the point in S that is closet to e.