This is a talk, rather than a research or survey paper. Very little of what I say will be original, but I wish to stimulate discussion on a set of issues that arise from the nature of risk and that I consider problematic to our profession. The paper is not exhaustive of references and many of my...

With information asymmetry between contracting parties, adverse selection may result. A separation may be achieved if low-risk types can signal their identity—for example, by selecting from a menu of price-quantity contracts. In such models, signaling is costly and solutions are, at best,...

Risk classification refers to the use of observable characteristics by insurers to group individuals with similar expected claims, to compute the corresponding premiums, and thereby to reduce asymmetric information. Permitting risk classification may reduce informational asymmetry-induced...

In this paper we propose an answer to the following problem of comparative statics in models with multiple sources of risk: How a risk averse agent will change his coinsurance demand when the distribution of the insurable loss is shifted? To answer the question, we first comment on Jack Meyer's...

C. Gollier (The Economics of Risk and Time. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001) has developed a standard technique based on the diffidence theorem. This theorem provides a very simple instrument to solve relatively sophisticated problems when preferences are state-independent. The object of this article...

In this article we study the effect of uncertainty on an entrepreneur who must choose the capacity of his business before knowing the demand for his product. The unit profit of operation is known with certainty, but there is no flexibility in our one-period framework. We show how the...