This paper analyzes how organizations can minimize the costs of processing and communicating information. Communication is costly because it takes time for an agent to absorb new information sent by others. Agents can reduce this time by specializing in the processing of particular types of...

This paper analyzes the issue of commitment in S. Grossman and O. Hart's model of optimal labor contracts under asymmetric information about firm profitability. The author extends his framework by allowing employment to vary over time, at equidistant intervals. When both parties can precommit ex...

This paper shows how the optimal financial structure of a firm complements incentive schemes to discipline managers, and how the securities' return streams determine the claimholders' incentives to intervene in management. The theory rationalizes (1) the multiplicity of securities, (2) the...

This paper develops a model of the breakup or unification of nations. In each nation the decision to separate is taken by majority voting. A basic trade-off between the efficiency gains of unification and the costs in terms of loss of control on political decisions is highlighted. The model...

The authors consider the case of a manufacturer who sells a homogeneous good to retailers who compe te in prices and "cum-sales" or "post-sales" services. They show that the optimal linear-price contract is inefficient from the point of view of the vertical structure and that simple forms of...

We propose an origination-and-contingent-distribution model of banking, in which liquidity demand by short-term investors (banks) can be met with cash reserves (inside liquidity) or sales of assets (outside liquidity) to long-term investors (hedge funds and pension funds). Outside liquidity is a...