Two types of moral hazard have been determined. The first type is related to self-prevention activities affecting probabilities of accidents. The second type relates to the agent's activities whenever the accident occurs. The authors' objective consists of presenting an empirical measure of the...

For many years, economists and actuaries have studied multiperiod insurance contracts independently and differently. The aim of this article is to reduce the gap between empirical studies on the determination of insurance premiums and theoretical studies on moral hazard and experience rating....

Insurance fraud is now recognized as a significant resourceallocation problem in many markets. The object of this study is to verify how straight deductible contracts may affect the equilibrium level of falsification in automobile insurance. This type of contract is observed in many markets,...

Road safety policies often use incentive mechanisms based on traffic violations to promote safe driving-—for example, fines, experience rating, and point-record driver's licenses. We analyze the effectiveness of these mechanisms in promoting safe driving. We derive their theoretical properties...