Showing 1 - 10 of 14
This paper models an agent in a multi-period setting who does not update according to Bayes' Rule, and who is self-aware and anticipates her updating behavior when formulating plans. Choice-theoretic axiomatic foundations are provided to capture updating biases that reflect excessive weight...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599401
This paper models an agent in a multi-period setting who does not update according to Bayes' Rule, and who is self-aware and anticipates her updating behavior when formulating plans. Choice-theoretic axiomatic foundations are provided to capture updating biases that reflect excessive weight...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515741
This paper extends the theory of temptation and self-control introduced by Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) to allow for increasing marginal costs of resisting temptation, that is, convex self-control costs. It also proves a representation theorem that admits a general class of self-control cost...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599426
This paper extends the theory of temptation and self-control introduced by Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) to allow for increasing marginal costs of resisting temptation, that is, convex self-control costs. It also proves a representation theorem that admits a general class of self-control cost...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008595766
A decision maker, named Alice, wants to know if an expert has significant information about payoff-relevant probabilities of future events. The expert, named Bob, either knows this probability almost perfectly or knows nothing about it. Hence, both Alice and the uninformed expert face...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599380
In 1908 the Welsh neurologist and psychoanlayst Ernest Jones described human beings as rationalizers whose behavior is governed by "the necessity of providing an explanation." We construct a formal and testable model of rationalization in which a decision maker selects her preferred alternative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599499
A decision maker, named Alice, wants to know if an expert has significant information about payoff-relevant probabilities of future events. The expert, named Bob, either knows this probability almost perfectly or knows nothing about it. Hence, both Alice and the uninformed expert face...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005730973
In 1908 the Welsh neurologist and psychoanlayst Ernest Jones described human beings as rationalizers whose behavior is governed by "the necessity of providing an explanation." We construct a formal and testable model of rationalization in which a decision maker selects her preferred alternative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010691960
Individuals often lose confidence in their prospects as they approach the `moment of truth.' An axiomatic model of such individuals is provided. The model adapts and extends (by relaxing the Independence axiom) Gul and Pesendorfer's model of temptation and self-control to capture an individual...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599389
The paper considers an agent who must choose an action today under uncertainty about the consequence of any chosen action but without having in mind a complete list of all the contingencies that could influence outcomes. She conceives of some relevant (subjective) contingencies but she is aware...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599392