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Reputation without commitment in finitely-repeated games

Yildiz, Muhamet; Weinstein, Jonathan - In: Theoretical Economics 11 (2016) 1, pp. 157-185

In the reputation literature, players have \emph{commitment types} which represent the possibility that they do not … payoffs. Then, classic reputation results can be achieved with uncertainty concerning only the stage payoffs. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599566

Reputation without commitment in finitely-repeated games

Yildiz, Muhamet; Weinstein, Jonathan - In: Theoretical Economics (2015)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011127591

Collective hold-up

Iaryczower, Matiás; Oliveros, Santiago - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 3, pp. 1063-1100

of complementary patents. In this context, we study how the allocation of bargaining power between principal and agents … completion, efficiency requires concentrating bargaining power in the principal. Strengthening the bargaining position of the … or discriminatory offers. When this collective action problem is severe enough, agents are better off when bargaining …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537034

One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining

Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David G.; Stacchetti, Ennio - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 3, pp. 719-773

A two-person infinite-horizon bargaining model where one of the players may have either of two discount factors, has a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599552

One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining

Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David G.; Stacchetti, Ennio - In: Theoretical Economics (2014)

A two-person infinite-horizon bargaining model where one of the players may have either of two discount factors, has a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010798203

Long information design

Koessler, Frédéric; Laclau, Marie; Renault, Jérôme; … - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 2, pp. 883-927

We analyze information design games between two designers with opposite preferences and a single agent. Before the agent makes a decision, designers repeatedly disclose public information about persistent state parameters. Disclosure continues until no designer wishes to reveal further...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536851

When Walras meets Vickrey

Delacrétaz, David; Loertscher, Simon; Mezzetti, Claudio - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 4, pp. 1803-1845

We consider general asset market environments in which agents with quasilinear payoffs are endowed with objects and have demands for other agents' objects. We show that if all agents have a maximum demand of one object and are endowed with at most one object, the VCG transfer of each agent is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536857

Exploiting social influence in networks

Nora, Vladyslav; Winter, Eyal - In: Theoretical Economics 19 (2024) 1, pp. 1-27

We study binary action network games with strategic complementarities. An agent acts if the aggregate social influence of her friends exceeds a transfer levied on the agent by a principal. The principal seeks to maximize her revenue while inducing everyone to act in a unique equilibrium. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536860

Informative tests in signaling environments

Weksler, Ran; Zik, Boaz - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 3, pp. 977-1006

We study a receiver's learning problem of choosing an informative test in a signaling environment. Each test induces a signaling subgame. Thus, in addition to its direct effect on the receiver's information, a test has an indirect effect through the sender's signaling strategy. We show that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536864

Optimal sequential contests

Hinnosaar, Toomas - In: Theoretical Economics 19 (2024) 1, pp. 207-244

I study sequential contests where the efforts of earlier players may be disclosed to later players by nature or by design. The model has many applications, including rent seeking, R&D, oligopoly, public goods provision, and tragedy of the commons. I show that information about other players'...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536866