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Asymmetric all-pay auctions with spillovers

Betto, Maria; Thomas, Matthew W. - In: Theoretical Economics 19 (2024) 1, pp. 169-206

When opposing parties compete for a prize, the sunk effort players exert during the conflict can affect the value of the winner's reward. These spillovers can have substantial influence on the equilibrium behavior of participants in applications such as lobbying, warfare, labor tournaments,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536891

Equilibria in symmetric games: Theory and applications

Hefti, Andreas - In: Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) 3, pp. 979-1002

This article presents a new approach to analyze the equilibrium set of symmetric, differentiable games by separating multiple symmetric equilibria and asymmetric equilibria. This separation allows the investigation of, for example, how various parameter constellations affect the scope for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010004

Strategic uncertainty and the ex-post Nash property in large games

Yu, Haomiao; Khan, M. Ali; Rath, Kali P.; Sun, Yeneng - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 1, pp. 103-129

This paper elucidates the conceptual role that independent randomization plays in non-cooperative game theory. In the context of large (atomless) games in normal form, we present precise formalizations of the notions of a mixed strategy equilibrium (MSE), and of a randomized strategy equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599536

Strategic uncertainty and the ex-post Nash property in large games

Yu, Haomiao; Khan, M. Ali; Rath, Kali P.; Sun, Yeneng - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 1

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145591

Auction design in the presence of collusion

Pavlov, Gregory - In: Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) 3, pp. 383-429

colluding agents can be used to reduce the revenue losses from collusion. In a class of environments we show that the principal … optimal mechanisms can be implemented as uniquely collusion-proof mechanisms. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599408

Auction design in the presence of collusion

Pavlov, Gregory - In: Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) 3

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515735

Collusion constrained equilibrium

Dutta, Rohan; Levine, David K.; Modica, Salvatore - In: Theoretical Economics 13 (2018) 1, pp. 307-340

We study collusion within groups in noncooperative games. The primitives are the preferences of the players, their … assignment to nonoverlapping groups, and the goals of the groups. Our notion of collusion is that a group coordinates the play of … requirement need not exist. We instead introduce the weaker notion of collusion constrained equilibrium. This allows groups to put …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010028

Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents

Chandrasekher, Madhav - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 1, pp. 11-49

collusion-proof contracts with two properties. First, equilibrium payoffs to both the principal and the agents approach their …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599533

Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents

Chandrasekher, Madhav - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 1

collusion-proof contracts with two properties. First, equilibrium payoffs to both the principal and the agents approach their …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145595

Slow persuasion

Escudé, Matteo; Sinander, Ludvig - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 1, pp. 129-162

What are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question in a dynamic model in which a `sender' provides public information over time subject to a graduality constraint, and a decision-maker takes an action in each period. Using a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536988