Showing 1 - 10 of 72
We study dynamic contracting with adverse selection and limited commitment. A firm (the principal) and a worker (the agent) interact for potentially infinitely many periods. The worker is privately informed about his productivity and the firm can only commit to short-term contracts. The ratchet...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013188991
A buyer wishes to purchase a durable good from a seller who in each period chooses a mechanism under limited commitment. The buyer's value is binary and fully persistent. We show that posted prices implement all equilibrium outcomes of an infinite-horizon, mechanism-selection game. Despite being...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015419652
We show how the prospect of disputes over firms' revenue reports promotes debt financing over equity. This is demonstrated in a costly state verification model with a risk averse entrepreneur. The prospect of disputes encourages incentive contracts that limit penalties and avoid stochastic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215300
We analyze a model in which workers direct their search on and off the job and employer-worker match productivities are private information. Employers can commit neither to post contracts such that wages are a function of tenure nor to disregard counteroffers. In this context, potential...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537025
This paper studies the optimal clearing arrangement for bilateral financial contracts in which an assessment of counterparty credit risk is crucial for efficiency. The economy is populated by borrowers and lenders. Borrowers are subject to limited commitment and hold private information about...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189053
I develop a theory of intermediation in a market where agents meet bilaterally to trade and buyers cannot commit to payments. Some agents observe the past trading history of traders in the market. These informed agents can secure trades by punishing traders who previously defaulted. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189066
The commitment ability of governments is neither infinite nor zero but intermediate. In this paper, we determine the commitment ability that a government needs to implement a unique equilibrium outcome and rule out self-fulfilling expectations. We show that, in a large class of static...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015419710
Several structural results for the set of competitive equilibria in trading networks with frictions are established: The lattice theorem, the rural hospitals theorem, the existence of side-optimal equilibria, and a group-incentive-compatibility result hold with imperfectly transferable utility...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536850
This paper investigates the conditions under which socially responsible investment (SRI) is neutral from the viewpoint of general equilibrium theory. Three conditions are jointly sufficient for neutrality of SRI. First, the financial market is complete and SRI does not compromise the spanning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536933
I model an incomplete markets economy where unaware agents do not perceive all states of nature, so unintended default can occur when asset returns differ from what was perceived. The presence of default plays a crucial role in the proof of existence - particularly in economies where beliefs are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537040