We propose a class of dynamic models that capture subjective (and hence unobservable) constraints on the amount of information a decision maker can acquire, pay attention to, or absorb, via an Information Choice Process (ICP). An ICP specifies the information that can be acquired about the...

One of the most well-known models of non-expected utility is Gul (1991)'s model of Disappointment Aversion. This model, however, is defined implicitly, as the solution to a functional equation; its explicit utility representation is unknown, which may limit its applicability. We show that an...

We study a decision maker (DM) who has preferences over choice problems, which are sets of payoff-allocations between herself and a passive recipient. An example of such a set is the collection of possible allocations in the classic dictator game. The choice of an allocation from the set is...

One of the most well known models of non‐expected utility is Gul's (1991) model of disappointment aversion. This model, however, is defined implicitly, as the solution to a functional equation; its explicit utility representation is unknown, which may limit its applicability. We show that an...

We study a decision maker (DM) who has preferences over choice problems, which are sets of payoff-allocations between herself and a passive recipient. An example of such a set is the collection of possible allocations in the classic dictator game. The choice of an allocation from the set is...