Showing 1 - 10 of 269
In this paper, I study the dynamic delegation problem in a principal-agent model wherein an agent privately observes a persistently evolving state, and the principal commits to actions based on the agent's reported state. There are no transfers. While the agent has state-independent preferences,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536863
multiplicative separability condition, the optimal mechanism offers a single contract. This condition holds, for example, when output … likelihood ratio property, the mechanism offers a single debt contract. Our results generalize if the output distribution is … "close" to multiplicatively separable. Our model suggests that offering a single contract may be optimal in environments with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536927
maximizing contracts in dynamic principal-agent models. The FO-approach works when the resulting FO-optimal contract satisfies a …-optimal contract if the frequency of interactions is sufficiently high (or equivalently if the discount factor, time horizon and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215290
to an NPV criterion can occur on the path of the contract. As past performance increases, the firm chooses projects which … efficiently, and project choice depends more on the NPV and less on the incentive costs. I implement the optimal contract with an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215308
We study the delegation problem between a principal and an agent, who not only has better information about the performance of the available actions but also superior awareness of the set of actions that are actually feasible. We provide conditions under which the agent finds it optimal to leave...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536865
The founder of a start-up (principal) who has a project with uncertain returns must retain and incentivize an agent using promise of future payments and information gathering. The agent's effort incrementally advances production and such advance is a prerequisite for gathering new information....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536898
upper semi-continuous in the control variable. We apply those conditions to economic environments in contract theory where …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536915
Motivated by markets for ``expertise,'' we study a bandit model where a principal chooses between a safe and risky arm. A strategic agent controls the risky arm and privately knows whether its type is high or low. Irrespective of type, the agent wants to maximize duration of experimentation with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536982
. An analyst is uncertain about what actions are available and evaluates a contract by the expected payoffs it guarantees …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537015
better future contract terms or task assignments rather than monetary bonuses. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537018