We present a new approach to studying equilibrium dynamics in a class of stochastic games with a continuum of players with private types and strategic complementarities. We introduce a suitable equilibrium concept, called Markov Stationary Nash Distributional Equilibrium (MSNDE), prove its...

This paper introduces a mechanism design approach that allows dealing with the multiple equilibrium problem, using mechanisms that are robust to bounded rationality. This approach is a tool for constructing supermodular mechanisms, i.e. mechanisms that induce games with strategic...

This paper introduces a mechanism design approach that allows dealing with the multiple equilibrium problem, using mechanisms that are robust to bounded rationality. This approach is a tool for constructing supermodular mechanisms, i.e. mechanisms that induce games with strategic...

This paper proposes a tractable model that allows us to analyze how agents' perception of relationships with others determines the structures of networks. In our model, agents are endowed with their own multidimensional characteristics and their payoffs depend on the social distance between...

The paper proposes a game of weighted network formation in which each agent has a limited resource to form links of possibly different intensities with other agents and to use for private purposes. We show that every equilibrium is either "reciprocal" or "non-reciprocal". In a reciprocal...

We develop a dynamic network formation model that can explain the observed nestedness in real-world networks. Links are formed on the basis of agents' centrality and have an exponentially distributed life time. We use stochastic stability to identify the networks to which the network formation...

This paper develops a simple model in which a social hierarchy emerges endogenously when agents form a network for complementary interaction (``activity''). Specifically, we assume that agents are ex ante identical and their best response activity, as well as their value function, increases...

This paper analyzes the formation of networks in which each agent is assumed to possess some information of value to the other agents in the network. Agents derive payoff from having access to the information of others through communication or spillovers via the links between them. Linking...

This paper develops a simple model in which a social hierarchy emerges endogenously when agents form a network for complementary interaction (``activity''). Specifically, we assume that agents are ex ante identical and their best response activity, as well as their value function, increases...

We develop a dynamic network formation model that can explain the observed nestedness in real-world networks. Links are formed on the basis of agents' centrality and have an exponentially distributed life time. We use stochastic stability to identify the networks to which the network formation...