Similar Search Results

Córdoba Muñoz, Juan C.; Liu, Xiying - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 1, pp. 415-460

This article studies socially optimal allocations, from the point of view of a benevolent social planner, in environments characterized by fixed resources, endogenous fertility, and full information. Individuals in our environment are fully rational and altruistic toward their descendants. Our...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189017

Search with multi-worker firms

Hawkins, William B.; Acemoglu, Daron - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 3, pp. 583-628

We present a generalization of the standard random-search model of unemployment in which firms hire multiple workers … investigation of the out-of-steady state dynamics of our model. We find that the responses of unemployment and of the vacancy to … unemployment ratio to a shock to labor productivity can be somewhat more persistent than in the Mortensen-Pissarides benchmark …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599523

Search with multi-worker firms

Hawkins, William B.; Acemoglu, Daron - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 3

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010934644

Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs

Fudenberg, Drew; Lanzani, Giacomo; Strack, Philipp - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 4, pp. 1585-1622

We show that Bayesian posteriors concentrate on the outcome distributions that approximately minimize the Kullback-Leibler divergence from the empirical distribution, uniformly over sample paths, even when the prior does not have full support. This generalizes Diaconis and Freedman (1990)'s...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536861

Dynamic delegation with a persistent state

Chen, Yi - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 4, pp. 1589-1618

In this paper, I study the dynamic delegation problem in a principal-agent model wherein an agent privately observes a persistently evolving state, and the principal commits to actions based on the agent's reported state. There are no transfers. While the agent has state-independent preferences,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536863

Informative tests in signaling environments

Weksler, Ran; Zik, Boaz - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 3, pp. 977-1006

We study a receiver's learning problem of choosing an informative test in a signaling environment. Each test induces a signaling subgame. Thus, in addition to its direct effect on the receiver's information, a test has an indirect effect through the sender's signaling strategy. We show that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536864

Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness

Auster, Sarah; Pavoni, Nicola - In: Theoretical Economics 19 (2024) 1, pp. 245-284

We study the delegation problem between a principal and an agent, who not only has better information about the performance of the available actions but also superior awareness of the set of actions that are actually feasible. We provide conditions under which the agent finds it optimal to leave...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536865

Data and incentives

Liang, Annie; Madsen, Erik - In: Theoretical Economics 19 (2024) 1, pp. 407-448

``Big data" gives markets access to previously unmeasured characteristics of individual agents. Policymakers must decide whether and how to regulate the use of this data. We study how new data affects incentives for agents to exert effort in settings such as the labor market, where an agent's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536868

Strategic investment evaluation

Kirpalani, Rishabh; Madsen, Erik - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 3, pp. 1141-1180

We study the interaction of incentives to free-ride on information acquisition and strategically delay irreversible investment in environments in which multiple firms evaluate an investment opportunity. In our model, two firms decide how quickly to privately obtain information about the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536873

Monologues, dialogues and common priors

Di Tillio, Alfredo; Lehrer, Ehud; Samet, Dov - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 2, pp. 587-615

The main purpose of this paper is to provide a simple criterion enabling to conclude that two agents do not share a common prior. The criterion is simple, as it does not require information about the agents' knowledge and beliefs, but rather only the record of a dialogue between the agents. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536875