This paper investigates the conditions under which socially responsible investment (SRI) is neutral from the viewpoint of general equilibrium theory. Three conditions are jointly sufficient for neutrality of SRI. First, the financial market is complete and SRI does not compromise the spanning...

The theory of large one-shot simultaneous-play games with a biosocial typology has been presented in both the individualized and distributionalized forms-large individualized games (LIG) and large distributionalized games (LDG), respectively. Using an example of an LDG with two actions and a...

This paper shows that in some axioms regarding the mixture of random variables, the requirement that the conclusions hold for all values of the mixture parameter can be replaced by requiring the existence of only one non-trivial value of the parameter, which needs not be fixed. This is the case...

We propose a class of dynamic models that capture subjective (and hence unobservable) constraints on the amount of information a decision maker can acquire, pay attention to, or absorb, via an Information Choice Process (ICP). An ICP specifies the information that can be acquired about the...

Among the reasons behind the choice behavior of an individual taking a stochastic form are her potential indifference or indecisiveness between certain alternatives, and/or her willingness to experiment in the sense of occasionally deviating from choosing a best alternative in order to give a...

I analyze sequential auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders who have independent private values and unit demand. Equilibrium bids are history dependent and subject to a discouragement effect: the higher the winning bid in the current round is, the less aggressive the bids of the...

Humans differ in their strategic reasoning abilities and in beliefs about others’ strategic reasoning abilities. Studying such cognitive hierarchies has produced new insights regarding equilibrium analysis in economics. This paper investigates the effect of cognitive hierarchies on long run...

The analysis of optimal risk sharing has been thus far largely restricted to non-expected utility models with concave utility functions, where concavity is an expression of ambiguity aversion and/or risk aversion. This paper extends the analysis to α-maxmin expected utility, Choquet expected...

We study contracting when both principal and agent have to exert noncontractible effort for production to take place. An analyst is uncertain about what actions are available and evaluates a contract by the expected payoffs it guarantees to each party in spite of the surrounding uncertainty....

The usual analysis of bidding in first-price auctions assumes that bidders know the distribution of valuations. We analyze first-price auctions in which bidders do not know the precise distribution of their competitors' valuations, but only the mean of the distribution. We propose a novel...