converging to one as a society grows large. Under truthful communication, we show that asymptotic learning occurs if (and under … response, it is an equilibrium when the communication network induces asymptotic learning. Moreover, we contrast equilibrium …) ensure the emergence of communication networks that lead to asymptotic learning. Our result shows that societies with too …

converging to one as a society grows large. Under truthful communication, we show that asymptotic learning occurs if (and under … response, it is an equilibrium when the communication network induces asymptotic learning. Moreover, we contrast equilibrium …) ensure the emergence of communication networks that lead to asymptotic learning. Our result shows that societies with too …

) equilibrium. Fully informative myopic and farsighted equilibria essentially take a particular simple form: all communication is … and analyze equilibrium welfare. Furthermore, we extend our model to public communication and investigate the implications …

when players can use communication to replicate any outcome that would have been sustainable were this information public …. A benchmark result is that if only cheap talk communication is possible then public information can only be replicated … without explicit communication or with cheap talk communication only. …

invest in pairwise active communication (speaking) and pairwise passive communication (listening). This leads to a full … that foster communication (especially active communication); and the discrepancy between formal hierarchy and actual …

invest in pairwise active communication (speaking) and pairwise passive communication (listening). This leads to a full … that foster communication (especially active communication); and the discrepancy between formal hierarchy and actual …

when players can use communication to replicate any outcome that would have been sustainable were this information public …. A benchmark result is that if only cheap talk communication is possible then public information can only be replicated … without explicit communication or with cheap talk communication only. …

I present a model of observational learning with payoff interdependence. Agents, ordered in a sequence, receive private … signals about an uncertain state of the world and sample previous actions. Unlike in standard models of observational learning … unbounded strength there is learning in a strong sense: agents' actions are ex-post optimal given both the state of the world …

the (possibly misspecified) prior belief that her local network is the entire network. We present a tractable learning … rule to implement such locally Bayesian learning: each agent extracts new information using the full history of observed …