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Price discrimination through communication

Sher, Itai; Vohra, Rakesh - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2, pp. 597-648

probability of negotiation breakdown in a bargaining protocol whose sequential equilibrium implements the optimal mechanism. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599549

Price discrimination through communication

Sher, Itai; Vohra, Rakesh - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2

probability of negotiation breakdown in a bargaining protocol whose sequential equilibrium implements the optimal mechanism. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777681

Optimal deadlines for agreements

Damiano, Ettore; Li, Hao; Suen, Wing - In: Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) 2, pp. 357-393

Costly delay in negotiations can induce the negotiating parties to be more forthcoming with their information and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599465

Optimal deadlines for agreements

Damiano, Ettore; Li, Hao; Suen, Wing - In: Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) 2

Costly delay in negotiations can induce the negotiating parties to be more forthcoming with their information and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009216675

Locally Bayesian learning in networks

Li, Wei; Tan, Xu - In: Theoretical Economics 15 (2020) 1, pp. 239-278

Agents in a network want to learn the true state of the world from their own signals and their neighbors' reports. Agents know only their local networks, consisting of their neighbors and the links among them. Every agent is Bayesian with the (possibly misspecified) prior belief that her local...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215328

The implications of finite-order reasoning

Brandenburger, Adam; Danieli, Alexander; Friedenberg, Amanda - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1605-1654

The epistemic conditions of rationality and mth-order strong belief of rationality (RmSBR; Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2002) formalize the idea that players engage in contextualized forward-induction reasoning. This paper characterizes the behavior consistent with RmSBR across all type...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013188995

Reason-based choice: a bargaining rationale for the attraction and compromise effects

de Clippel, Geoffroy; Eliaz, Kfir - In: Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) 1, pp. 125-162

solution to an intra-personal bargaining problem among different selves of an individual, where each self represents a … coincide with our bargaining solution, for some pair of preference relations. Second, we provide a revealed …-preference foundation to our bargaining solution and characterize the extent to which these two preference relations can be uniquely …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599458

Reason-based choice: a bargaining rationale for the attraction and compromise effects

de Clippel, Geoffroy; Eliaz, Kfir - In: Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) 1

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008800997

Dynamic delegation with a persistent state

Chen, Yi - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 4, pp. 1589-1618

In this paper, I study the dynamic delegation problem in a principal-agent model wherein an agent privately observes a persistently evolving state, and the principal commits to actions based on the agent's reported state. There are no transfers. While the agent has state-independent preferences,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536863

Sequential persuasion

Li, Fei; Norman, Peter - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 2, pp. 639-675

This paper studies sequential Bayesian persuasion games with multiple senders. We provide a tractable characterization of equilibrium outcomes. We apply the model to study how the structure of consultations affects information revelation. Adding a sender who moves first cannot reduce...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189015