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Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs

Fudenberg, Drew; Lanzani, Giacomo; Strack, Philipp - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 4, pp. 1585-1622

We show that Bayesian posteriors concentrate on the outcome distributions that approximately minimize the Kullback-Leibler divergence from the empirical distribution, uniformly over sample paths, even when the prior does not have full support. This generalizes Diaconis and Freedman (1990)'s...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536861

Dynamic delegation with a persistent state

Chen, Yi - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 4, pp. 1589-1618

In this paper, I study the dynamic delegation problem in a principal-agent model wherein an agent privately observes a persistently evolving state, and the principal commits to actions based on the agent's reported state. There are no transfers. While the agent has state-independent preferences,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536863

Informative tests in signaling environments

Weksler, Ran; Zik, Boaz - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 3, pp. 977-1006

We study a receiver's learning problem of choosing an informative test in a signaling environment. Each test induces a signaling subgame. Thus, in addition to its direct effect on the receiver's information, a test has an indirect effect through the sender's signaling strategy. We show that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536864

Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness

Auster, Sarah; Pavoni, Nicola - In: Theoretical Economics 19 (2024) 1, pp. 245-284

information rents. We further show that the principal may use the option of renegotiation as a tool to implement actions that are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536865

Data and incentives

Liang, Annie; Madsen, Erik - In: Theoretical Economics 19 (2024) 1, pp. 407-448

decide whether and how to regulate the use of this data. We study how new data affects incentives for agents to exert effort …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536868

Strategic investment evaluation

Kirpalani, Rishabh; Madsen, Erik - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 3, pp. 1141-1180

We study the interaction of incentives to free-ride on information acquisition and strategically delay irreversible investment in environments in which multiple firms evaluate an investment opportunity. In our model, two firms decide how quickly to privately obtain information about the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536873

Monologues, dialogues and common priors

Di Tillio, Alfredo; Lehrer, Ehud; Samet, Dov - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 2, pp. 587-615

The main purpose of this paper is to provide a simple criterion enabling to conclude that two agents do not share a common prior. The criterion is simple, as it does not require information about the agents' knowledge and beliefs, but rather only the record of a dialogue between the agents. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536875

Which misspecifications persist?

Fudenberg, Drew; Lanzani, Giacomo - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 3, pp. 1271-1315

We use an evolutionary model to determine which misperceptions can persist. Every period, a new generation of agents … use their subjective models and the data generated by the previous generation to update their beliefs, and models that … induce better actions become more prevalent. An equilibrium can resist mutations that lead agents to use a model that better …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536880

Censorship as optimal persuasion

Kolotilin, Anton; Mylovanov, Timofiy; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 2, pp. 561-585

We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where a sender's utility depends only on the expected state. We show that upper censorship that pools the states above a cutoff and reveals the states below the cutoff is optimal for all prior distributions of the state if and only if the sender's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536886

Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes

Gryglewicz, Sebastian; Kolb, Aaron - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 2, pp. 539-559

We study dynamic signaling in a game of stochastic stakes. Each period, a privately informed agent of binary type chooses whether to continue receiving a return that is an increasing function of both her reputation and an exogenous public stakes variable or to irreversibly exit the game. A...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536892