Showing 1 - 7 of 7
This paper develops a framework for studying repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale-Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long-lived players (firms) match with a new generation of short-lived players (workers) in every period. I define history-dependent and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537010
We investigate a normative theory of incomplete preferences in the context of preliminary screening procedures. We introduce a theory of ranking in the presence of objectively incomparable marginal contributions (apples and oranges). Our theory recommends benchmarking, a method under which an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010033
We generalize the standard revealed preference exercise in economics, and prove a sufficient condition under which the revealed preference formulation of an economic theory has universal implications and when these implications can be recursively enumerated. We apply our theorem to two theories...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010075
A planner wants to elicit information about an agent's preference relation, but not the entire ordering. Specifically, preferences are grouped into "types", and the planner only wants to elicit the agent's type. We first assume beliefs about randomization are subjective, and show that a space of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189077
We develop observable restrictions of well-known theories of bargaining over money. We suppose that we observe a finite data set of bargaining outcomes, including data on allocations and disagreement points, but no information on utility functions. We ask when a given theory could generate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599507
A planner wants to elicit information about an agent's preference relation, but not the entire ordering. Specifically, preferences are grouped into “types,” and the planner wants only to elicit the agent's type. We first assume that beliefs about randomization are subjective, and show that a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012637461
We develop observable restrictions of well-known theories of bargaining over money. We suppose that we observe a finite data set of bargaining outcomes, including data on allocations and disagreement points, but no information on utility functions. We ask when a given theory could generate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738408