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Collusion and delegation under information control

Asseyer, Andreas - In: Theoretical Economics 15 (2020) 4, pp. 1547-1586

This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189018

Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good

Doval, Laura; Skreta, Vasiliki - In: Theoretical Economics 19 (2024) 2, pp. 865-915

A buyer wishes to purchase a durable good from a seller who in each period chooses a mechanism under limited commitment. The buyer's value is binary and fully persistent. We show that posted prices implement all equilibrium outcomes of an infinite-horizon, mechanism-selection game. Despite being...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015419652

Informative tests in signaling environments

Weksler, Ran; Zik, Boaz - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 3, pp. 977-1006

We study a receiver's learning problem of choosing an informative test in a signaling environment. Each test induces a signaling subgame. Thus, in addition to its direct effect on the receiver's information, a test has an indirect effect through the sender's signaling strategy. We show that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536864

Censorship as optimal persuasion

Kolotilin, Anton; Mylovanov, Timofiy; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 2, pp. 561-585

We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where a sender's utility depends only on the expected state. We show that upper censorship that pools the states above a cutoff and reveals the states below the cutoff is optimal for all prior distributions of the state if and only if the sender's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536886

Conveying value via categories

Onuchic, Paula; Ray, Debraj - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 4, pp. 1407-1439

A sender sells an object of unknown quality to a receiver who pays his expected value for it. Sender and receiver might hold different priors over quality. The sender commits to a monotone categorization of quality. We characterize the sender's optimal monotone categorization, the optimality of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536944

Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach

Kolotilin, Anton - In: Theoretical Economics 13 (2018) 2, pp. 607-635

An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single-crossing assumption, so that the receiver with a higher type is more willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010038

Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent

Bardhi, Arjada; Guo, Yingni - In: Theoretical Economics 13 (2018) 3, pp. 1111-1149

A fully committed sender seeks to sway a collective adoption decision through designing experiments. Voters have correlated payoff states and heterogeneous thresholds of doubt. We characterize the sender-optimal policy under unanimity rule for two persuasion modes. Under general persuasion,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010053

Information design and sequential screening with ex post participation constraint

Heumann, Tibor - In: Theoretical Economics 15 (2020) 1, pp. 319-359

We study a principal--agent model. The parties are symmetrically informed at first; the principal then designs the process by which the agent learns his type and, concurrently, the screening mechanism. Because the agent can opt out of the mechanism ex post, it must leave him with nonnegative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215307

The persuasion duality

Dworczak, Piotr; Kolotilin, Anton - In: Theoretical Economics 19 (2024) 4, pp. 1701-1755

We present a unified duality approach to Bayesian persuasion. The optimal dual variable, interpreted as a price function on the state space, is shown to be a supergradient of the concave closure of the objective function at the prior belief. Strong duality holds when the objective function is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015419672

Delegating learning

Escobar, Juan F.; Zhang, Qiaoxi - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 2, pp. 571-603

Learning is crucial to organizational decision making but often needs to be delegated. We examine a dynamic delegation … delegation as a dynamic mechanism design problem and characterize the optimal delegation scheme. We show that private learning … discuss implications on learning delegation for distinct organizations. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189076