Ranking methods are fundamental tools in many areas. Popular methods aggregate the statements of `experts' in different ways. As such, there are various reasonable ranking methods, each one of them more or less adapted to the environment under consideration.This paper introduces a new method,...

Ranking methods are fundamental tools in many areas. Popular methods aggregate the statements of `experts' in different ways. As such, there are various reasonable ranking methods, each one of them more or less adapted to the environment under consideration.This paper introduces a new method,...

This paper studies a game of attack and interception in a network, where a single attacker chooses a target and a path, and each node chooses a level of protection. We show that the Nash equilibrium of the game exists and is unique. We characterize equilibrium attack paths and attack...

We analyze the formation of partnerships in social networks. Players need favors at random times and ask their neighbors in the network to form exclusive long-term partnerships that guarantee reciprocal favor exchange. Refusing to provide a favor results in the automatic removal of the...

We analyze the formation of partnerships in social networks. Players need favors at random times and ask their neighbors in the network to form exclusive long‐term partnerships that guarantee reciprocal favor exchange. Refusing to provide a favor results in the automatic removal of the...