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Hatfield, John William; Kominers, Scott Duke; Nichifor, … - In: Theoretical Economics 14 (2019) 4, pp. 1535-1590

properties in diverse settings such as matching, auctions, and exchange economies with indivisible goods. We extend earlier …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215327

On rank dominance of tie-breaking rules

Allman, Maxwell; Ashlagi, Itai; Nikzad, Afshin - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 2, pp. 707-748

Lotteries are a common way to resolve ties in assignment mechanisms that ration resources. We consider a model with a continuum of agents and a finite set of re- sources with heterogeneous qualities, where the agents’ preferences are generated from a multinomial-logit (MNL) model based on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536972

Stability in repeated matching markets

Liu, Ce - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 4, pp. 1711-1757

This paper develops a framework for studying repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale …-Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long-lived players (firms) match with a new generation of short-lived players (workers …) in every period. I define history-dependent and self-enforcing matching processes in this repeated matching environment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537010

Job security, stability, and production efficiency

Fu, Hu; Kleinberg, Robert D.; Lavi, Ron; Smorodinsky, Rann - In: Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) 1, pp. 1-24

We study a two-sided matching market with a set of heterogeneous firms and workers in an environment where jobs are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010061

Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources

Pycia, Marek; Ünver, M. Utku - In: Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) 1, pp. 287-329

The allocation and exchange of discrete resources, such as transplant organs, public housing, dormitory rooms, and many other resources for which agents have single-unit demand, is often conducted via direct mechanisms without monetary transfers. Incentive compatibility and efficiency are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010070

School choice with asymmetric information: Priority design and the curse of acceptance

Kloosterman, Andrew; Troyan, Peter - In: Theoretical Economics 15 (2020) 3, pp. 1095-1133

We generalize standard school choice models to allow for interdependent preferences and differentially-informed students. We show that in general, the commonly-used deferred acceptance mechanism is no longer strategy-proof, the outcome is not stable, and may make less informed students worse...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189024

Revenue from matching platforms

Marx, Philip; Schummer, James - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 3, pp. 799-824

We consider the pricing problem of a platform that matches heterogeneous agents using match-contingent fees. Absent prices, agents on the short side of such markets capture relatively greater surplus than those on the long side (Ashlagi et al. 2017). Nevertheless we show that the platform need...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189028

Matching with floor constraints

Akin, Sumeyra - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 3, pp. 911-942

Floor constraints are a prominent feature of many matching markets, such as medical residency, teacher assignment, and … military cadet matching. We develop a theory of matching markets under floor constraints. We introduce a stability notion …, which we call floor respecting stability, for markets in which (hard) floor constraints must be respected. A matching is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189041

Chain stability in trading networks

Hatfield, John William; Kominers, Scott Duke; Nichifor, … - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 1, pp. 197-234

In a general model of trading networks with bilateral contracts, we propose a suitably adapted chain stability concept that plays the same role as pairwise stability in two-sided settings. We show that chain stability is equivalent to stability if all agents' preferences are jointly fully...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189046

Rank-optimal assignments in uniform markets

Nikzad, Afshin - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 1, pp. 25-55

We prove that in a market where agents rank objects independently and uniformly at random, there exists an assignment of objects to agents with a constant average rank (i.e., an average rank independent of the market size). The proof builds on techniques from random graph theory and the FKG...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189072