Similar Search Results

Chen, Yi-chun; Hu, Gaoji - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 1, pp. 29-56

This paper studies a stability notion and matching processes in the job market with incomplete information on the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159014

Gross substitutes and endowed assignment valuations

Ostrovsky, Michael; Paes Leme, Renato - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 853-865

We show that the class of preferences satisfying the Gross Substitutes condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982) is strictly larger than the class of Endowed Assignment Valuations of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), thus resolving the open question posed by the latter paper. In particular, our result...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673201

Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains

Mishra, Debasis; Roy, Souvik - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 8 (2013) 2, pp. 431-466

one-sided matching problem with agents having dichotomous types. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011686695

Competing mechanisms in markets for lemons

Auster, Sarah; Gottardi, Piero - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 3, pp. 927-970

We study directed search equilibria in a decentralized market with adverse selection, where uninformed buyers post general trading mechanisms and informed sellers select one of them. We show that this has differing and significant implications with respect to the traditional approach, based on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012104602

Competing with asking prices

Lester, Benjamin; Visschers, Ludo; Wolthoff, Ronald - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 2, pp. 731-770

In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller will take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the seller...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011705187

On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions

Goeree, Jacob K.; Lien, Yuanchuan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 1, pp. 41-52

When goods are substitutes, the Vickrey outcome is in the core and yields competitive seller revenue. In contrast, with … complements, the Vickrey outcome is efficient but not necessarily in the core and revenue can be low. Non-core outcomes may be … perceived as unfair since there are bidders willing to pay more than the winners' payments. Moreover, non-core outcomes render …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673080

Delegating learning

Escobar, Juan F.; Zhang, Qiaoxi - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 2, pp. 571-603

Learning is crucial to organizational decision making but often needs to be delegated. We examine a dynamic delegation problem where a principal decides on a project with uncertain profitability. A biased agent, who is initially as uninformed as the principal, privately learns the profitability...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587421

Monologues, dialogues and common priors

Di Tillio, Alfredo; Lehrer, Ehud; Samet, Dov - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 2, pp. 587-615

The main purpose of this paper is to provide a simple criterion enabling to conclude that two agents do not share a common prior. The criterion is simple, as it does not require information about the agents' knowledge and beliefs, but rather only the record of a dialogue between the agents. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013273764

Network structure and naive sequential learning

Dasaratha, Krishna; He, Kevin - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 2, pp. 415-444

We study a sequential-learning model featuring a network of naive agents with Gaussian information structures. Agents apply a heuristic rule to aggregate predecessors' actions. They weigh these actions according the strengths of their social connections to different predecessors. We show this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308406

Common learning and cooperation in repeated games

Sugaya, Takuo; Yamamoto, Yuichi - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 3, pp. 1175-1219

We study repeated games in which players learn the unknown state of the world by observing a sequence of noisy private signals. We find that for generic signal distributions, the folk theorem obtains using ex-post equilibria. In our equilibria, players commonly learn the state, that is, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012309585