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Gayer, Gabrielle; Persitz, Dotan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 3, pp. 937-969

problem, termed the multi-core, wherein an agent consents to participate in the grand coalition if she can envision a … cooperating with the grand coalition rather than operating alone. An allocation is in the multi-core if all agents consent to … participate in the grand coalition. We provide a theorem characterizing the non-emptiness of the multi-core and show that the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671885

Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars H.; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 3, pp. 753-777

A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674186

On bargaining norms as solutions to cost-minimization problems

Tatur, Tymon - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 4, pp. 1443-1472

This paper studies bargaining outcomes in economies in which agents may be able to impose outcomes that deviate from the relevant social norms but incur costs when they do so. It characterizes bargaining outcomes that are easiest for a society to sustain as part of a social norm that everybody...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015135347

Decentralized bargaining in matching markets : efficient stationary equilibria and the core

Elliott, Matthew L.; Nava, Francesco - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 1, pp. 211-251

This paper studies market clearing in matching markets. The model is non-cooperative, fully decentralized, and in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012020318

On the consistency of data with bargaining theories

Chambers, Christopher P.; Echenique, Federico - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 1, pp. 137-162

We develop observable restrictions of well-known theories of bargaining over money. We suppose that we observe a finite data set of bargaining outcomes, including data on allocations and disagreement points, but no information on utility functions. We ask when a given theory could generate the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011684957

Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects

Ekici, Özgün - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 2, pp. 551-564

We revisit the classical object reallocation problem under strict preferences. When attention is constrained to the set of Pareto-efficient rules, it is known that top trading cycles (TTC) is the only rule that is strategy-proof and individually rational. We relax this constraint and consider...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014576683

The Coase conjecture with incomplete information on the monopolist's commitment

Kim, Kyungmin - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 4 (2009) 1, pp. 17-44

A key to the Coase conjecture is the monopolist's inability to commit to a price, which leads consumers to believe that a high current price will be followed by low future prices. This paper studies the robustness of the Coase conjecture with respect to these beliefs of consumers. In particular,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011699204

Bargaining over an endogenous agenda

Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 2, pp. 445-482

We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is then implemented. Our main goal is to study the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674462

Alternating‐offer bargaining with the global games information structure

Tsoy, Anton - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 2, pp. 869-931

In this study, I examine the alternating‐offer bilateral bargaining model with private correlated values. The correlation of values is modeled via the global games information structure. I focus on the double limits of perfect Bayesian equilibria as offers become frequent and the correlation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856724

Optimal deadlines for agreements

Damiano, Ettore; Li, Hao; Suen, Wing-chuen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 2, pp. 357-393

Costly delay in negotiations can induce the negotiating parties to be more forthcoming with their information and improve the quality of the collective decision. Imposing a deadline may result in stalling, in which players at some point stop making concessions but switch back to conceding at the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011690720