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Gayer, Gabrielle; Persitz, Dotan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 3, pp. 937-969

problem, termed the multi-core, wherein an agent consents to participate in the grand coalition if she can envision a … cooperating with the grand coalition rather than operating alone. An allocation is in the multi-core if all agents consent to … participate in the grand coalition. We provide a theorem characterizing the non-emptiness of the multi-core and show that the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671885

Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars H.; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 3, pp. 753-777

A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674186

Decentralized bargaining in matching markets : efficient stationary equilibria and the core

Elliott, Matthew L.; Nava, Francesco - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 1, pp. 211-251

This paper studies market clearing in matching markets. The model is non-cooperative, fully decentralized, and in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012020318

On the consistency of data with bargaining theories

Chambers, Christopher P.; Echenique, Federico - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 1, pp. 137-162

We develop observable restrictions of well-known theories of bargaining over money. We suppose that we observe a finite data set of bargaining outcomes, including data on allocations and disagreement points, but no information on utility functions. We ask when a given theory could generate the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011684957

Optimal deadlines for agreements

Damiano, Ettore; Li, Hao; Suen, Wing-chuen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 2, pp. 357-393

Costly delay in negotiations can induce the negotiating parties to be more forthcoming with their information and improve the quality of the collective decision. Imposing a deadline may result in stalling, in which players at some point stop making concessions but switch back to conceding at the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011690720

Ashamed to be selfish

Dillenberger, David; Sadowski, Philipp - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 1, pp. 99-124

We study a decision maker (DM) who has preferences over choice problems, which are sets of payoff-allocations between herself and a passive recipient. An example of such a set is the collection of possible allocations in the classic dictator game. The choice of an allocation from the set is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011690900

Alternating‐offer bargaining with the global games information structure

Tsoy, Anton - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 2, pp. 869-931

In this study, I examine the alternating‐offer bilateral bargaining model with private correlated values. The correlation of values is modeled via the global games information structure. I focus on the double limits of perfect Bayesian equilibria as offers become frequent and the correlation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856724

One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining

Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David G.; Stacchetti, Ennio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 719-773

A two-person infinite-horizon bargaining model where one of the players may have either of two discount factors, has a multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria. Introducing the slightest possibility that either player may be one of a rich variety of stationary behavioral types singles out a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673276

Reason-based choice : a bargaining rationale for the attraction and compromise effects

De Clippel, Geoffroy; Eliaz, Kfir - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 1, pp. 125-162

Among the most important and robust violations of rationality are the attraction and the compromise effects. The compromise effect refers to the tendency of individuals to choose an intermediate option in a choice set, while the attraction effect refers to the tendency to choose an option that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011690873

Judicial precedent as a dynamic rationale for axiomatic bargaining theory

Fleurbaey, Marc; Roemer, John E. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 2, pp. 289-310

Axiomatic bargaining theory (e.g., Nash's theorem) is static. We attempt to provide a dynamic justification for the theory. Suppose a Judge or Arbitrator must allocate utility in an (infinite) sequence of two-person problems; at each date, the Judge is presented with a utility possibility set in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011694978